Processo e método: a influência do paradigma racionalista no conceito de sentença

Abstract

This study have the intent to indicate the substrate immanent to the modern concept of the sentence understood as the definitive act, in your double meaning, such as the act that puts an end on the proceeding or the processual phase and the only act of the procedure capable of define the merit of the cause, according to the principles of the traditional doctrine. The accomplishment of this work counts with the approach of the judicial, philosophical and doctrinal perspective about the theme. For this desideratum it was used the phenomenological “method”. As a result of having adopted this "method", it is necessary to start from the assumption that the interpreter should be prepared to let the thing (Law) “be” in your “presence”, without forgetting that himself (interpreter) is part of the understanding process. Thus, efforts will be made to demonstrate that the concept of sentence relates to another act of the judge in the civil procedure, more specific on what is meant by interlocutory decision. To the interlocutory decision, unlike the sentence, would be denied access to the merit of the cause – according to traditional doctrine, which follows the Italian model – and it would be a decision that never ends the procedure, and is preceding the sentence always. It will be demonstrated that what is meant by the sentence is actually a reflection of rationalism and their attachment for the search of certainty and mathematically demonstrable truths.