O Sumo Bem como complementação necessária da teoria moral kantiana

Abstract

The following thesis aims at offering a broad and systematic interpretation of the doctrine highest good. Based on that, we defend that the idea of highest good represents a necessary complement to Kant‟s moral theory. In order to defend that, it is needed to present the context in which the idea of highest good is introduced by Kant, observing that in this period there was no moral theory itself yet, which was based on the autonomy of the will. It is important to emphasize that both during development and among the different phases of critical philosophy the idea of highest good has been there. Thus, it is essential to analyze the relationship between the idea of highest good and the theory of morality, taking into consideration that sometimes the concept seems to be unstable regarding the foundations of the moral theory. It happens that, although the concept or idea of highest good has already its legitimacy ensured since the beginning of critical period, it is from a practical perspective of reflective judgment that it will become an essential part of the moral theory and of the architectonic of pure reason. On one hand, the following thesis has the objective of rebuilding Kant‟s argumentation regarding the idea of highest good during the critical period and, on the other hand, showing that the concept of highest good does not compromise the fundamental principle of morality. Besides that, considering that the idea of highest good is constantly retaken by Kant himself in his critical philosophy, we defend that the highest good not only has an assured place, but a privileged one in moral philosophy. Even though the highest good is an object of faith for practical pure reason moral it theologically complements moral theory representing pure reason ultimate goal for rational human beings.