Kelsen sobre o lugar da lógica no âmbito normativo

Abstract

The attendant work advances as a central goal the analysis of the problem of logical principles applicability to the normative ambit, according to the conceptions of the Austrian philosopher of Law, Hans Kelsen. This problem doesn t receive the same approach by the author along his several works. Thus, the problem will be in this work inquired by distinguishing three phases in its treatment by Kelsen. The arguments that correspond to the three phases lie, respectively, in the works General Theory of Law and State (1945), the second edition of the Pure Theory of Law (1960) and the General Theory of Norms (1979), the main study objects in this work. Each chapter will hence approach the treatment of one of these phases, in order to, along them, analyse not only the main theses and concepts of Kelsen about the relation between Logic and Law, but also the motivations and purposes that leaded the author to leave old theses in behalf of new ones. It s intended that such approach will be able to elucidate the already traditional problem about the possibility of a relation between the principles of Logic mainly the principle of non-contradiction and the rule of inference and Moral and Legal norms. In order to achieve that, through the presentation and analysis of each one of Kelsen s postures about the problem, is searched a systematic regard of the different arguments given for its treatment, which represent a growing refuse of Kelsen for the logical elements insertion in the normative field. Nevertheless, until end up refusing this application, Kelsen s inquiry crosses over less extreme approaches, in which are noticed the limitations of some concepts and theses inside his theory, that will be, some of them, modified or abandoned, in behalf of one ultimate approach, severely commited to the positivists and purists ideals maintained by the author.