Responsabilidade e sentimentos morais: uma proposta de naturalização da responsabilidade moral

Abstract

This study seeks to address the relevance of moral sentiments for moral responsibility attribution through reactive theory of Peter Strawson and his critics. The central thesis which I try to hold onto is that the attribution of moral responsibility is something quite complex, it is related to how we respond the actions of the agents, but also involves the rational capacity of reflective self-control agent, being able to present reasons for his action and be able to control his desires. Thus, the morally responsible agent is one that is motivated by his desires, but he is able to reason morally on what the consequences of his action. In other words, be a responsible person involves having social competence to act in accordance with moral norms, but also be able to reflect on his practice, so a subject with normal cognitive powers and able to regulate his beliefs and desires. Given the cultural pluralism, we note that there is a symmetrical relationship between the moral sentiments and moral beliefs, so that the moral sentiments may be influenced by moral beliefs we form throughout our life as well as moral beliefs are formed from feelings. These moral beliefs may be revised or regulated, this review may come from the acquisition of new information, which may come from comparing our set of beliefs with the set of beliefs of another culture. But this regulation of moral beliefs is the result of an evolutionary process that our species suffered, which it has made over the years, people could improve their way of working with the others, and also be able to autonomously question whether certain beliefs are in fact true. What I propose is that science is an ally of ethics, and scientific explanations can contribute to a better understanding of what is morally right and wrong. Understanding our human nature we become more able to 'see' the world differently and realize that certain emotions can contribute to our social life. In this way, we can realize that it makes no sense to continue resentful of someone in a situation which the agent has good grounds for leaving to feel such a feeling. Realizing this we can notice the complexity of our human species and how much we still need to advance the field of morality, seeking a moral improvement that does not happen only in the context of standards, but mostly at maturity that allows being able to analyze the circumstances and the reasons for the action with greater discernment. To defend such a position, I will use Strawson reactive theory, and criticism raised to such a theory by Wallace (1994), Russell (2002) and Fischer and Ravizza (1998), namely that Strawson fails to present a rational capacity guide the allocation of moral responsibility. The solution to this problem is to defend the rational capacity, as well as the social competence of the agent, it is a necessary condition to consider the morally responsible people, including the rational capacity of the agent is what allows him to reflect on his social practice. To better assess these issues it is necessary an analysis of the moral psychology and knowledge to know about the way people in their daily lives assess the actions of the agents and consequently assign moral responsibility to them. So my goal is to show how proposal of Strawson is still relevant to discussions about attribution of moral responsibility, as well as propose a progress in discussion on this topic by means of a moral realist naturalist position.