Como um príncipe deve agir para manter a lealdade: o uso estratégico das políticas alimentares para cooptar os militares na Venezuela de Maduro entre 2013 e 2019

Abstract

Why is Venezuelan food policy so militarized? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by analyzing the use of Venezuelan food policy as a strategy to co-opt the Venezuelan military. Based on the definition given by Selznick (1948), co-optation is understood as a process of negotiation between political actors that aims to overcome the threats faced by organizations and/or leaders who offer benefits to powerful agents in exchange for stability. We conducted a study case, employing process tracing as a research method, to analyze the evolution of food policy in Venezuela and the associated conflicts. The research was based on documentary sources, mainly official, such as laws, decrees and sentences collected in the Gaceta Oficial (the Venezuelan Official Gazette ), but also on speeches by relevant leaders to analyze the participation of the military and how the bureaucratic structure of the food policy generated personal benefits for the military in the context of a political crisis that threatened Maduro's survival in the presidency. Based on this analysis, we identified three mechanisms that allowed the co-optation of the military through food policy: patronage, the increase in the powers of the Ministry of Defense and the revolving door between the entities of the Ministry of Food and the Strategic Operational Command of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces (CEOFANB) of Venezuela.