Hermenêutica e realismo moral: uma abordagem da objetividade do bem a partir da hermenêutica gadameriana

Abstract

This work aim to analyze the possibilities of being implicated in the Gadamer's hermeneutics theory an Ethical conception of Good, that is, an objective conception of the Good. To reach this goal we start from the exposition of the relation in the hermeneutics between reason and Tradition. This relationship shows how the formation of human rationality is particularized and linked to the conceptual schemas available in the cultural traditions in which we are educated. Because of the fact that the close connection between rationality and language we approach the hermeneutics of the coherentist versions of truth with the theoretical help of Alcoff. We did this with the intention of examining how these approaches dealt with the accusations of cultural relativism that are constant the philosophical positions that emphasize the importance of the language in the formation of our beliefs on the world and, mainly, on the moral beliefs. It was through the Anglo-Saxon postures that we were able to provide the material necessary for hermeneutics to be broadened in scope and to arrive at a conception of the Good as an objective characteristic of the human being. A notion of the good as the telos of a human life that managed to flourish. Figal was central to this process, because it was in his approach that we managed to articulate the conception of hermeneutics space as the locus in which Freedom of action manifests itself, which brings with it the recognition of our dependence on others and the importance of cultural education adequate for that we did not act through ignorance. From the unveiling of the status of the natural being of the human being, the naturalistic moral realism with all the necessary normative load finally emerged for us. We can thus show how the normativity itself of actions is a result of our "encounters" with others not only in the horizon-temporal horizon, but in the space horizon itself. In this way, we have normativity no longer as an element deduced logically a priori, but as an element that belongs to our nature and that appears to us. In the same way we experience freedom we experience normativity. Thus, we show that hermeneutics may have as one of its results a version of naturalistic moral realism.